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Ramatoulaye is a town of about 5,000 
inhabitants,  situated  some  30  kilo-
metres  from  Ouahigouya,  the  former 
capital of the Moaga Empire, regional 
headquarters  of  the  French  colonial 
administration.  Ramatoulaye  was  first 
founded  as  a  simple  village,  around 
1920 by Aboubaker Savadogo, a man 
who  had  received  the  Tidjani  Order 
wird. The present-day city was built by 
his  son  Mohammed,  who  succeeded 
Shaykh Aboubakr at his death in 1945. 
Ramatoulaye,  since  then,  has  been 
steadily growing. The site has acquired 
a  considerable  symbolic  dimension, 
becoming one of the central shrines of Islam in Burkina and, beyond 
that, in western Africa.
Today, however, Ramatoulaye has to meet a number of challenges if 
it is to sustain and augment its spiritual centrality and socio-political 
legitimacy. On the Islamic front, it faces competition from the “twelve 
bead”  Tidjani  Order  and  from  Wahhabi  currents.  It  also  finds  itself 
caught up in a religious bidding war, especially with active Christian 
evangelical movements. Above all it has to play its hand wisely in its 
relationship with the semi-authoritarian Burkinabé regime, which uses 
religion as well as tribal social forces to consolidate its popular legiti-
macy. Accordingly, the Ramatoulaye brotherhood has carried out a se-
ries of redeployments, which can best be seen in the light of modern 
African history and the presence and role of Islam.
Colonization and the Tidjani Order
The colonization of Western Africa, which picked up speed in the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century, was a major cause of the destruction 
and de-legitimization of existing social structures, thereby, creating the 
conditions for an increase in the legitimacy of Islam as a means of col-
lective identity. In addition, unification of territories, road building, and 
modernizing means of communication allowed faster and wider circula-
tion of persons and ideas. The result was a new phase of the expansion 
of Islam during the colonial period between 1850 
and 1950. During this turbulent period, the Tidjani 
Order took up different positions in regard to the 
colonizing power. Some leaders originated jihad-
ist movements, like that of Hajj Umar in the mid-
nineteenth century. In reaction to the catastrophic 
results of this jihad, which led to armed conflict be-
tween Muslims, some leaders collaborated, within 
certain limits, with the colonizing power. 
One branch of the Tidjaniyya, in the Volta basin, 
distanced itself from this political context. It strong-
ly emphasized the spiritual nature of the Sufi mes-
sage and practised a sort of “spiritual” resistance 
as a protest against the colonizers. At Nioro in the 
Sahel, Shaykh Hamallah, who had received the Tid-
jani wird, initiated a variant (at the beginning of the 
1920’s) referred to as the Tidjaniyya of the “eleven 
beads.”2 Through reciting 11 times the Jawharat al 
kamâl (pearl of perfection) in the dikhr, he distin-
guished his variant from the classic Tidjani practice 
of reciting it twelve times. According to the Hamal-
list tradition, it was Shaykh Tidjani himself who re-
cited the pearl of perfection 11 times. This return to 
11 recitations thus signifies a return to the sources 
of the Tidjaniyya and its spirituality. An esoteric in-
terpretation  reported  by  Hampate  Bâ 
also indicates that the figure 11 is that 
of pure spirituality, of communion with 
God, whereas the figure 12 is that of the 
temporal  engagement.  This  symbolic 
gesture indicated that it was necessary 
to spiritualize the Tidjaniyya path and re-
lieve it of all terrestrial encumbrances. 
The  French  colonizers  would  term 
this  variant  “Hamallist,”  and  the  term 
remains  in  use  today. The  French  saw 
Hamallah and the Hamallists as danger-
ous opponents of colonial policy. Their 
repressive  response  increased  after 
1940 under the Vichy regime. Hamallah 
was imprisoned, later deported to France, where he died in 1943. Hamal-
lism boasted important figures in Western Africa such as Diarno Boka 
Tall, the “sage of Bandiagara,” a title bestowed by Hampaté Bâ, who had 
himself converted to Hamallism. In Upper Volta, Hamallism was spread 
through three people who received the wird and who were designated 
muqaddem  (representatives)  by  Hamallah  himself.  One  was  Moussa 
Aminou, established in Diori in the northern part of Upper Volta, in the 
Sahel region. He launched a jihad in 1949, which lasted exactly 24 hours 
before being bloodily put down and he himself killed. The second was 
Abdoullaye Doukouré who introduced Hamallism among the Peuls from 
his base in the town of Djibo. The third was Aboubaker Savadogo who 
received the Tidjani wird and was then named muqaddem of the “eleven 
beads” by Hamallah in 1923. 
The construction of a Shaykh and a utopia
Shaykh Aboubaker, the founder of Ramatoulaye, completed his Qu-
ranic studies in 1908. After a ten-year pilgrimage, which led him to the 
holy places and later to Ghana, he returned to his village having received 
the Tidjani wird. He was thrown out by the animist chiefs, whose prestige 
had been shaken by Aboubaker’s preaching, which they felt undermined 
ancient beliefs (ancestor cults, foundations of traditional power). Abou-
baker then began to formulate the project of building a holy city for pure 
Muslims, which he called Ramatoulaye.3 Numerous of the faithful joined 
the Shaykh.
Ramatoulaye  underwent  colonial  control  and  repression,  especially 
after the Shaykh’s adoption of Hamallism. Shaykh Aboubaker was im-
prisoned, his adepts were dispersed and Ramatoulaye was destroyed. 
Aboubaker was freed in 1947 following changes in French colonial policy. 
As described in one of the interviews, “He was given (a sentence of) ten 
years. They took five of them. God took the rest.” Aboubaker died a few 
months after being released. His successor and son, Muhammad Sava-
dogo, successfully imposed his authority in 1945 just before his father’s 
death and instituted a new phase of the brotherhood, which consisted of 
a complete institutionalization of the charismatic nature of the founder. 
First, Shaykh Muhammad changed the patronym Savadogo (very current 
in Yatenga province) to that of Maïga, in reference to a Muslim ancestor. 
He thus constructed a long Islamic lineage and at the same time inaugu-
rated a dynasty of Shaykhs. He then redesigned the city and the zaouyya, 
which includes the tomb of the founder. In 1962, he set up the great 
mosque, which can hold a thousand persons, copied from the mosque of 
Nioro, and designated it for Friday prayers. The city was divided into four 
quarters whose names all refer to the Islamic world: Mecca, Medina, Fez, 
Dar as Salaam. 
Today Ramatoulaye, the “city of the Shaykh,” ruled by the Shaykh’s jus-
tice has in its population third and fourth generation residents. These resi-
dents are very vocal about Ramatoulaye’s attractions: “We came to find 
the truth.” “We came to follow the Master.” The Shaykh “had Islam.” Follow-
Religious movements are playing a new role of 
social consolidation in many African countries. 
In these contexts of “insecure modernization”1 
religious groups and images provide followers 
new bases for social solidarity, as well as 
identity and moral references. Similarly, new 
expressions of African Islam which, while 
founding themselves on the old tariqas, carry 
out modernizing transformations in an attempt 
to respond to contemporary situations and 
expectations. This is the case for the “eleven 
bead” variant of the Tidjani Sufi Order, whose 
spiritual centre is the “city” of Ramatoulaye in 
western Burkina Faso. 
[T]he attraction of 
Ramatoulaye [is] 
the city’s ability 
to present itself 
as a successful 
social model, quite 
apart from its holy 
character.
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ing the Shaykh also bears fruit: “When we converted to Islam, 
parents refused (us) their daughters. So the Shaykh provided a 
woman,” as the story of a first-hour adept is told. If one comes 
here, one must do “what is commanded,” for “the Shaykh has 
instituted  the  law.” “We  have  peace  in  our  hearts”  because 
the Shaykh has offered “a paved road to salvation.” The city is 
made holy by the presence of the Shaykh, as by the rhythm 
of prayers and the dhikr held in the purest Tidjani tradition. 
However, this local holiness is male. Women are confined to 
the domestic sphere, even excluded from the daily agricultural 
work so many African women perform. In September 2003 we 
saw TV antennas appear on the roofs of a few houses. It is as if 
the masculine (and Shaykh) power was obliged to bend a little 
to accommodate modern needs.
Present challenges
The  proclamation  of  Burkinan  independence  in  1960  led 
Ramatoulaye, along with many other religious forces, to take 
a position in the new order of an independent nation-state. 
Its resistance to colonization gave the brotherhood credibility, 
but nonetheless several years were needed before Ramatou-
laye understood how it should position itself in the context of 
a new state. In 1985, under Sankara’s regime, the brotherhood 
was  suspected  of  plotting. The  other  Hamallist  branch,  led 
by Abdoullaye Doukouré from Djibo, a few dozen kilometres 
from Ramatoulaye, rapidly gained a foothold in the capital of 
the Burkinabean State, close to the new power. Only upon the 
death in 1987 of Mohammed Maïga did the current Shaykh launch a strat-
egy of gaining visibility in Ouagadougou, the capital. From that point, a 
true political exchange took place. Ramatoulaye contributed to the legiti-
mization of the regime ruling Burkina Faso, and in turn was legitimized 
by the central government. The change of status was reflected in the par-
ticipation of the President—a Catholic—in the Mawlid festivities in 1990. 
Conversely, in 2002 the Shaykh was part of a delegation received by the 
President on the occasion of the “day of pardoning,” a critical moment in 
recent Burkinabean history.
Education is the new concern that Ramatoulaye is eager to take ad-
vantage of. It poses interesting questions since education is situated at 
the intersection of different contemporary logics. The weakening of the 
Burkinabean State, following sanctions imposed by international agen-
cies, created new incentives for privatization of the educational system. 
The state, which has become a member of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, has agreed to recognize “Franco-Arab” schools in response to 
pressure from Muslim associations. Ramatoulaye hastened to use these 
new possibilities. With financial assistance from the Libyan Islamic Call, a 
“Franco-Arabic” high school was opened at Ramatoulaye, which included 
a teacher-training programme. In 1998, the government accredited the 
school. The teachers, young inhabitants of Ramatoulaye, have finished 
their studies in various Islamic universities (al Azhar, Zitouna, Damascus) 
through grants offered by the Libyan Islamic Call. Participation in this 
“modern” form of education, in contrast to classical forms of Quranic edu-
cation, has placed the brotherhood in the mainstream of the country’s 
efforts toward development, while also confirming its membership in the 
new “locality” which is the nation-state.
Through the development of these schools we see at Ramatoulaye a 
process, often observed in African countries, of an increasing Arabization 
among intellectuals and middle-level white-collar workers. This is only 
partly attributable to the role played by the Quranic schools and the clas-
sical madrasas. It is also a matter of Arabization accompanied by literacy. 
Arabic is no longer only a means of oral expression in symbol and ritual, 
and Arabic script and writing a devotional form transmitted by the perish-
able calligraphy of Quranic schools. Arabic is now a spoken language and, 
even more importantly, a written language which has become a source 
of normativity. This process of globalization of a written sacred language 
introduces new dynamics and challenges to the charisma of the Shaykh, 
traditionally rooted in the person of the Shaykh, and sets him in competi-
tion with scholars of the written word and daily pragmatic norm.
Furthermore, the growth of the population and the presence of institu-
tions of learning raise the question of whether the city should be enlarged, 
or should be restricted to its current size, of about 5,000 inhabitants. An 
enlargement of the city would seem to require more mosques. But “there 
must be only one path, therefore one single mosque” in the words of an 
interviewee. Making the city larger would imply an increase in various ac-
tivities, thereby creating a risk that norms which govern the unity of the 
city might be disturbed. Certainly, with the arrival of the third generation, 
the question will be to see if Ramatoulaye will be able to respond to the 
needs of the young men of today and to the suppressed aspirations of its 
women. This is perhaps the greatest challenge of the future, now that the 
pioneers of the Shaykh’s generation are disappearing gradually.
Finally, the Tidjani, like all the brotherhoods, are typical participants in 
the dynamic of globalizing Islam, which while procuring their own expan-
sion as a brotherhood introduces innovative features. One novelty, for ex-
ample, is their introduction to global networks of the Libyan Islamic Call, 
just as the other branch of Hamallism is integrated into the wider Saudi 
network. Ramatoulaye itself appears to be at the beginning of a process 
of globalization properly so called. The radial influence of Ramatoulaye 
has begun to affect various localities and even to go beyond Burkina. 
Members from neighbouring countries (like Mali, Niger, Ghana, Benin) 
participate in the pilgrimage of Mawlid, one of the greatest moments in 
the life of Ramatoulaye. Diplomatic representatives 
of these countries also attend, as well as members 
of other branches of the Tidjani. It is certainly not to 
be attributed solely to the mystical aura of the cur-
rent Shaykh, who appears to be more a nimble po-
litical figure than a mystic. Rather, the attraction of 
Ramatoulaye may lay in the city’s ability to present 
itself as a successful social model, quite apart from 
its  holy  character: “If  you  come  in  clear-minded 
fashion, you will obtain that which you seek. And 
then you will testify to others …” It is precisely these 
very challenges and opportunities that will deter-
mine Ramatoulaye’s future prosperity or its mere 
survival. 
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Notes
1. See: P. J. Laurent, Les pentecôtistes du Burkina 
Faso. Mariage, Pouvoir et guérison (Paris: 
Karthala, 2003), 448.
2. Hamallism has often been studied by 
colonial administrators as well as academic 
researchers. See for example: B. Savadogo, 
Confreries et pouvoirs. La Tijaniyya 
Hamawiyya en Afrique occidentale (Burkina 
Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger): 1909-1965 (Aix 
en Provence: University de Provence, 1998). 
3. Research on Ramatoulaye is directed and 
administered by Felice Dassetto and Pierre 
Joseph Laurent (CISCOW/CISMOC and 
LAAP) at the Catholic University of Louvain-
la-Neuve with the collaboration of Tasseré 
Ouedraogo. The project has included several 
site visits and a hundred interviews made 
between 2003 and 2006.  
See: http://www.cismoc.ucl.ac.be/.
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